Facts. William Khine killed his wife in their home, then claimed that voices had commanded him to do so. Khine’s counsel asked for a psychological evaluation of Khine’s sanity at the time of the offense, so the court appointed a clinical psychologist to evaluate him. The psychologist testified at trial that at the time of the offense, Khine “was unable to rationally think through the reality of the situation, and assaulted his wife, following the directives of the voices he was hearing.” She testified that there was “evidence to suggest that Khine was experiencing symptoms to the extent of impairing his ability to resist the impulse to commit the offense.” A neighbor testified that she had spoken with Khine nearly daily for nine months and that she had never seen him talking to himself or someone else not present. Over Khine’s objection, a co-worker testified that, the day before the wife’s death, she told the co-worker that she was planning to tell Khine that she wanted a divorce. The co-worker later saw the couple together with Khine visibly upset.
After closing arguments, the trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to strike Khine’s insanity defense because Khine failed to show as a matter of law that he was “totally deprived of the mental power to control or restrain” his actions. The court convicted Khine of first-degree murder.
Issue. (1) Whether the co-worker’s testimony concerning the wife’s statement that she was planning on telling Khine that she wanted a divorce was admissible. (2) Whether the trial court properly granted the Commonwealth’s motion to strike.
Holding. (1) The wife’s statement was admissible under the Hillmon doctrine. (2) Khine met his burden of production to support his insanity defense, therefore it was error to grant the motion to strike.
Notes. (1) Under the Hillmon doctrine, a statement is admissible as proof of a person’s “intent and the corresponding probability that [they] indeed” fulfilled that intent. Here, the wife stated that she was going to tell Khine that she wanted a divorce. That statement was admissible as evidence that the wife acted in accordance with her plan. Taken together with the co-worker’s testimony that after the wife told her this, she saw the couple together with Khine visibly upset, this evidence “made it more probable…than if there had been no such proof” that the wife carried out her stated intent.
(2) Khine based his insanity on the irresistible-impulse doctrine, which required him to prove that at the time of the offense his mind had become “so impaired by disease that he was totally deprived of the mental power to control or restrain his act.” Insanity is an affirmative defense, so Khine had “both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion.” The burden of production requires a prima facie showing that the evidence meets the requirements of the fact to be proven. In other words, a party must provide “evidence that will establish a fact…unless contradictory evidence is produced.” Here, the trial court granted the motion to strike because the psychologist “did not address Khine’s inability to control his actions or restrain himself,” but that was because it failed to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to Khine, the non-moving party. The psychologist testified that at the time Khine killed his wife he was “unable to rationally think through the reality of the situation,” “followed the directives of the voices he was hearing,” and experienced symptoms “to the extent of impairing his ability to resist the impulse to commit the offense.” This evidence was sufficient to meet Khine’s burden of production. Since the trial court found that Khine had not met his burden of production, it never considered whether he had met his burden of persuasion. Therefore, the case was remanded for the trial court to make that determination.
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