The Supreme Court of Virginia releases two opinions today. In this one, it addresses the standard of review that applies when a circuit court grants a plea in bar after considering certain evidence presented by the parties.
Steve Thomas Jurnigan filed suit in 2017 against Michael Stevens, James Bowes, and the Southampton Bowmen Club, asserting claims based on sexual abuse that occurred between 1993 and 2000, when Jurnigan was between 8 and 15 years old. The defendants filed pleas in bar, arguing that Jurnigan’s claims were time-barred under the version of Code § 8.01-249(6) in effect when he reached majority in 2002. That statute provided that a cause of action for injuries resulting from childhood sexual abuse accrued upon removal of the disability of infancy, or, if the causal connection was not then known, when it was first communicated by a licensed professional. Under the 2002 version of Code § 8.01-243(A), the applicable limitations period was two years.
At the plea-in-bar hearing, the parties submitted Jurnigan’s deposition testimony and accompanying exhibits, including written statements Jurnigan had given to police during the criminal investigation, as the evidence in the case. No live testimony was taken. The circuit court found that the evidence established Jurnigan knew of the causal connection between the abuse and his injuries before reaching adulthood, pointing to his own statements describing flashbacks, anxiety, PTSD-like symptoms, and behavioral disruptions he attributed to the abuse while still a student. The circuit court accordingly held that his claims accrued in 2002 and became time-barred in 2004.
The Court of Appeals reversed. Because the circuit court had not heard ore tenus testimony, the Court of Appeals concluded the factual findings were entitled to no deference and reviewed the matter de novo as if the pleas were summary judgment motions. Finding a genuine dispute of material fact, it held the circuit court erred in granting the pleas.
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the circuit court’s judgment. The Court explained that a plea in bar is fundamentally different from a summary judgment motion: unlike summary judgment, a plea in bar may require the resolution of disputed facts. When parties present evidence on a plea in bar and submit the matter to the court rather than a jury, the circuit court must resolve the factual dispute, and its findings are entitled to substantial appellate deference.
The Court emphasized that while findings based on ore tenus evidence receive the weight of a jury verdict, findings based on deposition testimony are also presumptively correct and cannot be disturbed if reasonably supported by substantial, competent, and credible evidence. A judgment based on depositions, while not as conclusive as one based on live testimony, is still entitled to great weight and can only be reversed if plainly wrong or without evidentiary support.
Applying that deferential standard, the Court found that the circuit court’s determination was reasonably supported by the record. The Court of Appeals itself had acknowledged the “myriad of statements” demonstrating Jurnigan’s knowledge of the causal connection as a minor. The circuit court’s factual findings were neither plainly wrong nor unsupported, so the claims properly accrued in 2002 and were time-barred by 2004.
The practical takeaway is that when a circuit court resolves contested facts on a plea in bar—whether based on live testimony, depositions, or documentary evidence—the Court of Appeals must apply a deferential standard of review, not de novo review. The nature of the proceeding (plea in bar vs. summary judgment) and the fact that evidence was presented and weighed by the trial court are what trigger deference, not the form of the evidence.
A Virginia Appellate Law Blog 